An eye on Balochistan border

THE intensifying Yemeni Houthi strikes on Saudi Arabia have triggered a debate over the possible activation of the Makkah accord. Statements and clarifications about possible and emerging scenarios are coming from all stakeholders.

But a recent incident in Saravan county in Sistan-Baluchestan, close to the Pakistan border, has also drawn attention to the Iran-Pakistan border region. This has broadened the debate over the Gulf region’s security and evolving geopolitics, and Pakistan’s role in it.

The incident was reported on Sept 12, when heavy fighting between Iranian security forces and unidentified gunmen spread across parts of Saravan, with reports of attacks on military vehicles and dozens of security personnel killed or wounded. Although the identity of the armed group is not yet clear, some analysts have attributed the attack to Jaish al-Adl or the People’s Fighters Front, an alliance of several groups, reportedly including Jaish al-Adl.

Since the start of the conflict in West Asia, Balochistan’s security dynamics have changed. The conflict has altered the operating environment in which an existing insurgency was already functioning.

The BLA and other allied groups have intensified their terrorist activities. The economic blockade announced by these groups has disrupted transportation and halted economic activity, particularly in the mineral sector. The closure of the frontier with Afghanistan and the partial closure of the border with Iran have contributed to the crisis. Taken together, these developments have affected the region’s security, internal political dynamics and geopolitical environment, bringing new risks to the province.

An angle that has largely been overlooked in the broader conflict theatre in this area is the state of affairs along the Pakistan-Iran border, which stretches for around 900 kilometres and where multiple violent religious and nationalist insurgent groups, as well as transnational criminal networks, operate. The border’s porous nature raises further security concerns. According to media reports, Pakistani security institutions had placed Balochistan on high alert because of the possible fallout from the Iran war.

The situation along the Pakistan-Iran border in the broader conflict has been largely overlooked.

The Jan 16, 2024, Iranian strike inside Pakistan, allegedly targeting Jaish al-Adl hideouts, followed by Pakistan’s retaliatory strikes on militant targets in Iran, changed the dynamics of their bilateral relations and prompted greater security cooperation. That cooperation has largely remained intact.

However, the recent Saravan attack has raised questions about how the changing regional environment could affect the future course of frontier security, particularly as Pakistan’s border with Afghanistan remains closed and Iran is an alternative, although very expensive, route for transnational trade.

For Iran, if the Revolutionary Guard (IRGC) has to concentrate its resources on US and Israeli strikes, the Strait of Hormuz and operations in the Gulf, Sistan-Baluchestan could become a per­ipheral theatre competing for Iranian security resources. Any escalation of tensions betw­een Iran and Pakistan is in neither country’s interest. However, non-state actors always try to find an opportunity in evolving conflicts, especially when wider regional contexts provide them with more meaning and relevance in the conflict theatre.

The BLA and other insurgent groups appear to have viewed the war as an opportunity to escalate their operations, perhaps hoping that they could eventually be considered as potential proxies against Iran, as happened in Syria with America’s partnership with the Syrian Demo­cratic Forces. The SDF was a coalition that included Kurdish armed groups such as the YPG and YPJ, along with Syrian Arab and Assyrian/ Christian elements.

The BLA has also issued a few statements supporting US strikes on Iran. Perhaps the BLA believes it can find meaning in the wider conflict in West Asia. Still, the BLA is missing a point in its calculation: the convergence of US, Pakistani, and Saudi geopolitical and strategic interests will persist in the coming years.

At the same time, Jaish al-Adl and several smaller groups have reportedly sought to broaden their activities against the Quds Force and IRGC. The group remained relatively quiet until Iranian security forces launched an operation against suspected terrorists in Saravan last August, reportedly apprehending several Jaish al-Adl members and killing one. During the operation, security forces said they recovered a significant arsenal of military hardware, including dozens of Kalash­nikov automatic rifles, hand grenades, RPG-7 launchers, around 20 kilograms of C-4 military-grade explosives, 150 rounds of ammunition, and several Starlink satellite internet devices.

The Saravan operation reported last week has since been interpreted in multiple ways, mostly based on assumptions rather than established evidence. One popular theory links the attack to the intensification of Houthi strikes on Saudi Arabia.

The incident also occurred while Pakistan was diplomatically engaged with Iran. According to a media report, subsequently denied by Pakistan, Islamabad had conveyed a Saudi message to Tehran asking Iran to restrain the Houthis.

A popular perception in the border region of Balochistan is that if Iran can use the Houthis as a proxy against Saudi Arabia, it must also expect the possibility of a similar reaction from Saudi Arabia. The Sunni militias operating in Sistan-Baluchestan, from Jundullah to the People’s Fighters Front, are said to be proxies of foreign powers including the US and Saudi Arabia. That perception is nurturing new theories. A few of them are critical of Pakistan too.

Whether such perceptions translate into an actual Saudi strategy is another question. But perceptions themselves can influence the behaviour of armed groups and local actors, particularly in a region where terrorist networks, cross-border tribal connections and informal economic networks overlap.

Beyond all the theories surrounding the strategic calculus of West Asia and the prospects of Saudi proxies emerging along the Pakistan-Iran border, one fact remains clear: Pakistan cannot afford further chaos in the border region of Balochistan. Any expansion of the regional conflict in an already fragile security environment could make the country’s internal security dynamics considerably more complex.

The writer is a security analyst.

Published in Dawn, September 20th, 2026